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A Uniform Test Isn't Here Right Now, But Please Leave a
Message: How Altering the Spence Symbolic Speech Test
Can Better Meet the Needs of an Expressive Society
Caitlin Housley'
INTRODUCTION
A peace sign. A flag. A war. Combined, these items were enough to incite
nearly half a century of constitutional confusion and judicial debate that has yet to
be resolved. In 1974, the Supreme Court of the United States embarked on what
has now become the seemingly impossible task of declaring a sufficient test for
symbolic speech protection under the First Amendment.2 It all started when one
college student decided to protest the Vietnam War by fixing a duct tape peace sign
onto the American Flag.3 In the judicial proceedings following the incident, the
Supreme Court articulated that in order for conduct to fall within the purview of
the First Amendment, the Court must ask whether "[a]n intent to convey a
particularized message was present, and . . . the likelihood was great that the
message would be understood by those who viewed it."4
Nearly twenty years later, the Court formulated a more diluted test, claiming
that such a strict "particularized message" requirement would prohibit First
Amendment protection for artistic works such as "the unquestionably shielded
painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of
Lewis Carroll."s However, the Court has yet to articulate which test is better suited
for approaching cases of symbolic speech, and this lack of uniformity has led to a
spilt among the circuits.6 Yet even with a more diluted test, the Court could not
have anticipated living in a society that relies on Facebook "like" buttons, YouTube
videos, and emojis7 to express their ideas on a daily basis.
' J.D. Graduate, 2015, University of Kentucky College of Law-, B.A. in Communication
Studies, 2012, Saint Mary's College.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 406 (1974) (per curiam).
Spence, 418 U.S. at 406.
4 Id. at 410-11.
sHurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).
6 As of 2008, there were over 1,600 citations to Spence in subsequent cases, many of which adopt
differing versions of the Spence test. James M. McGoldrick, Jr., Symbolic Speech: A Message from
Mind to Mind, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 57 (2008).
7 Emojis are described as small images, typically used in text messages, to enhance communication.
See Matt McFarland, Emojis: Silly Teenage Fad or Frontier of Modern Communication?, WASH.
POST (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/innovations/wp/2013/11/12/emojis-
silly-teenage-fad-or-frontier-of-modem-communication/.
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A uniform test for symbolic speech that protects abstract means of
communication is crucial in a culture where people rely on technology, clothing,
hairstyles, brands, and even tattoos to express their personalities and send messages
about what they value in life. A uniform test would help ensure that people know
whether or not their actions are protected when engaging in new forms of symbolic
speech. As easy as it may have been for the Court to sidestep articulating a uniform
test in the past, this problem will simply prove to be more complex and ever
expanding as society continues to evolve. Thus, this Note proposes a dynamic test
for symbolic speech that is strict enough to uphold the sanctity of the First
Amendment while still being flexible enough to protect today's means of expression
that are meant to be uniquely interpreted by each observer.
Part I of this Note will discuss how the test for symbolic speech has evolved
since its origin in Spence v. Washington.! Part II examines how four different
circuits have adopted and altered the original test for symbolic speech. Lastly, Part
III proposes a more dynamic test for symbolic speech by textually altering the
existing tests and drawing on the importance of conduct and context in every
symbolic speech case. Ultimately, this Note argues that by changing two words of
the original Spence test and reincorporating a context element, the test can
adequately adapt to protect those unique, artistic messages that intend a different
meaning for each viewer who encounters them.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SYMBOLIC SPEECH TEST
A. Spence's "Particuhrized" Message
On May 10, 1970, America was recovering from the tragic shootings at Kent
State University while anticipating the Cambodian Campaign waged by President
Richard Nixon during the Vietnam War.9 In order to express his disapproval,
college student Harold Spence affixed duct tape in the shape of a peace sign to the
front and back of the American flag and hung it upside down from his window for
the community to see.'o However, instead of silently protesting the shootings and
the war as Spence had planned, his actions led to a landmark case for the symbolic
speech doctrine. Spence was arrested for violating a Washington statute regarding
misuse of the flag. When questioned about his actions, Spence said, "I felt there
had been so much killing and that this was not what America stood for. I felt that
the flag stood for America and I wanted people to know that I thought America
stood for peace.""
Although the Constitution's literal protection extends only to "freedom of
speech,"" the Court acknowledged that Spence's nonverbal action would constitute
'Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11.
' Id. at 405-06.
10 Id.
n Id. at 408.
12 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech. . .
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speech that the framers had intended to protect.' 3 In fact, the concept of nonverbal
conduct as speech dates back even to the 1940s, when the Supreme Court held that
saluting the flag could be protected under the First Amendment, stating that
"[s]ymbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas."1 4
Instead, the true issue arose when the Court acknowledged a need for drawing a
line in symbolic speech cases. Noting that speech could be found in almost any
mundane daily action, such as putting on clothes or walking down the street," the
Supreme Court in United States v. O'Brien asserted, "We cannot accept the view
that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the
person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea."'" In an effort to
weed out what they labeled "mindless nihilism,"" the Court in Spence
acknowledged that conduct must be "sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication to fall within the scope of the First . . . Amendment[]."" In
determining this, the Court suggested that the context of the conduct was an
important factor to consider because context could help give a symbol or conduct
meaning.' 9
However, the Court did more than suggest that conduct must be sufficiently
imbued with elements of communication. Instead, they outlined a two-prong test,
declaring that Spence's conduct was symbolic speech because "[a]n intent to convey
a particularized message was present, and in the surrounding circumstances the
likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed
it."20 This test remained largely unchanged for the next fifteen years and was cited
as the leading authority for symbolic speech by famous cases like Wooley v.
Maynard, the New Hampshire "Live Free or Die" license plate case.2 ' However,
the test was slightly refined in 1989 in Texas v.Johnson.22
In johnson, the Court faced yet another flag case. This time, however, the
respondent burned the flag as part of a march protesting the Reagan
administration. 2' When asked about his conduct, Johnson replied, "The American
Flag was burned as Ronald Reagan was being renominated as President. And a
more powerful statement of symbolic speech, whether you agree with it or not,
couldn't have been made at that time. It's quite a just position Uuxtaposition]. We
la See Spence, 418 U.S. at 409-10.
14 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943).
15 See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) ("It is possible to find some kernel of
expression in almost every activity a person undertakes-for example, walking down the street or
meeting one's friends at a shopping mall-but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within
the protection of the First Amendment."). Although Stanglin was decided nearly twenty years after
O'Brien, this "kernel of expression" idea is often quoted alongside the O'Brien Court's assertion that the
evaluation of conduct as speech can be quite limitless. McGoldrick, supra note 6, at 39-40.
16 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
" Spence, 418 U.S. at 410.
's Id. at 409.
'9 Id. at 410.
20 Id. at 410-11.
25 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977).
2 491 U.S. 397, 404-06 (1989).
23 Id. at 399-400.
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had new patriotism and no patriotism."24 In determining whether the conduct
should be protected as symbolic speech, the Court quoted Spence, asking, "whether
'[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and [whether] the
likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed
it."'2s
However, the Johnson Court deleted the "surrounding circumstances" portion
of the Spence test's second prong by inserting an omission bracket around
"whether."26 As originally articulated in Spence, the test read, "An intent to convey
a particularized message was present, and in the surrounding circumstances the
likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed
it."27 Later in its opinion, the Johnson Court mentioned surrounding circumstances
in passing." Yet later courts largely overlooked this discrepancy and instead focused
only on what Johnson articulated to be the two more important elements of the
test-a particularized message and a great likelihood that others would understand
that message. 29
For example, in Cressman v. Thompson, a case concerning an Oklahoma
license plate, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals cited the Spence test, italicizing
what they understood to be the two elements of the test for symbolic speech. " The
court said, "An intent to convey a particularized message was present, and in the
surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it."" It used Johnson's interpretation of Spence by
paying no attention to the "surrounding circumstances"32 element in its articulation
of the symbolic speech elements. Like the Cressman court, other courts interpret
the symbolic speech test to have two elements, both lacking any articulation of the
importance of surrounding circumstances. Context has largely become an
afterthought in the search for a uniform symbolic speech test, and courts have now
moved to criticizing the "particularized message"" element as where the Spence
test lacks merit. One specific case challenged the "particularized message"34
requirement to such an extent that it changed the way many courts would view
both the Spence and the Johnson tests still today-Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group ofBoston."
24 Id. at 406 (alteration in original).
2s Id. at 404 (alteration in original) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)).
26 Compare id., with Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974).
" Spence, 418 U.S. 410-11 (emphasis added).
28Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406. ("In these circumstances, Johnson's burning of the flag was conduct ...
29 Id. at 404.
Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139, 1149 (10th Cir. 2013).
a Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)).
32 Spence, 418 U.S. at 411.
33 Id.
34 Id.
s Hurleyv. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 568-70 (1995).
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B. Hurley's Liberalization of the Spence Test
Breaking free of the landmark flag decisions, Hurley involved a parade. The
City of Boston authorized the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council ("the
Council") to host a St. Patrick's Day-Evacuation Day Parade. 6 In deciding which
organizations were allowed a place in the parade, the Council denied a place for
GLIB-an organization formed by gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals." GLIB's
solely wanted to march in the parade to show pride in their Irish heritage as well as
their sexual orientation, and to show others that such a community existed.3 1
Members of GLIB filed suit alleging that the Council had violated a Massachusetts
public accommodation law making it illegal to deny an organization participation
in a parade solely because the organization's views did not parallel the parade
organizer's view.39 In defense, the Council asserted that the statute violated their
First Amendment guarantee of free speech.40 Ultimately holding that parades do
constitute symbolic speech worthy of First Amendment protection,4' the Hurley
Court seemingly altered nearly twenty years of symbolic speech precedent.
Although the main issues in Hurley were forced association and discrimination
(concepts not related to symbolic speech),42 modern courts have interpreted Hurley
as either modifying symbolic speech precedent or completely rejecting it.43
Particularly, courts cite Hurley because it seemed to liberalize what many now label
to be the strict Spence test. The Hurley Court engaged in a fairly short discussion
of whether or not a parade would be conduct protected by free speech, focusing
more on the facts of the case than on explaining the legal justifications of their
decision." The majority of the Court's legal analysis occurred in just one sentence
that eliminated the "particularized message" element of the Spence test.45 In what
some consider to be a "sudden unprovoked attack"46 on Spence, the Hurley Court
asserted that "a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of
constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a
'particularized message,' . . . would never reach the unquestionably shielded
painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of
Lewis Carroll."47
3 Id. at 560-61.
37 Id. at 561.
3s Id.
" See id.
4 Id. at 563.
" Id. at 566.
42 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1008, 1206
(4th ed. 2011) (listing Hurley under the subheadings "Compelled Speech" and "Freedom of
Association" rather than "Symbolic Speech: Conduct That Communicates").
43 McGoldrick, supra note 6, at 49.
4Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568-69.
45 Id. at 569.
6 McGoldrick, supra note 6, at 49.
' Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569.
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While this one sentence is quoted by most cases and scholarly articles as
completely changing the symbolic speech doctrine,48 the Hurley Court's best
attempt at explaining why they abolished twenty years of symbolic speech
precedent was by saying that "a private speaker does not forfeit constitutional
protection simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their
themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the speech."49
Essentially, the Court believed a parade would not be considered symbolic speech
under the Spence test because a particular message (what the Court defined as "a
narrow, succinctly articulable message")so could not be deciphered from a parade
and even though the petitioners could not articulate a message, they should not be
penalized.
After Hurley, the Court saw an influx of cases that branched off from such
meritorious holdings regarding flag desecration,s' cross burning,52 war protesting,s"
and sit-ins 54 to cases involving weddings on beaches, 5 license plates," school dress
codes,5 7 and sagging pants.5 But with each new case, courts have been reluctant to
adopt any one, concrete test and instead have adopted a number of ways to tiptoe
around the issue and decide cases without ever declaring which test is most
deserving of recognition.5 9
II. HOW THE CIRCUITS SPLIT
The confusion stemming from a lack of uniformity on this issue is most
apparent in the lower courts, as many circuits have adopted differing views on the
symbolic speech issue.60 The Second, Eleventh, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits each
have articulated their different approaches to symbolic speech. One has kept the
Spence test intact, even in the wake of Hurley. Another applies Hurley, but adds a
" Paul E. Salamanca, Video Games as a Protected Form of Expression, 40 GA. L. REV. 153,
167-68 (2005) ("This finding has enormous and unmistakable value for the development of
non-cognitive forms of expression, both as a means of affecting audiences and as a means of promoting
self-development.").
4 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569-70.
so Id. at 569.
5" See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 402-06 (1989); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 405,
414-15 (1974).
52 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358-63 (2003).
s3 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507-09 (1969).
54 See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293-94 (1984) (involving
organization that sought permit to erect tents in public park to symbolize the plight of the homeless
during the winter months).
s' See Kaahumanu v. Hawaii, 682 F.3d 789, 798-99 (9th Cir. 2012).
56 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1977); Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139,
1148-51 (10th Cir. 2013).
17 See Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 388-91 (6th Cir. 2005).
s Bivens ex rel. Green v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 899 F. Supp. 556, 559-60 (D.N.M. 1995); see
also William C. Vandivort, I See London, I See France: The Constitutional Challenge to "Saggy" Pants
Laws, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 667, 680-94 (2009).
5 See, e.g., Cressman, 719 F.3d at 1150 (describing the four different tests adopted in five circuits).
' See McGoldrick, supra note 6, at 56-76.
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"reasonable person" element. The remaining two believe that Spence and Hurley
can coexist.
A. The Second Circuit's Originalist Approach
The Second Circuit expressed its intent to leave the Spence test intact even
after the Hurley decision in Church of the American Knights of the Ku Klux Klan
v. Kerik.6' In Kerik, the American Knights, an "unincorporated political
membership association that advocates on behalf of the white race and the
Christian faith," applied to the New York Police Department for an event permit."
The Police Department denied the permits, informing the organization that their
plans to dress in traditional garb including robes, hoods, and masks resembling the
Ku Klux Klan of the Reconstructionist era would violate New York's anti-mask
law."3 After much judicial debate, the organization obtained a preliminary
injunction and hosted the event as planned."
Later, the court addressed the problem further when both sides filed for
summary judgment in proceedings before the court. The district court initially
granted summary judgment for the American Knights on five different grounds, all
relating to the First Amendment.6 s Regarding symbolic speech, the district court
stated that masks would be protected, despite the defendant's argument that they
do not advance a "particularized message." 6 Using the Hurley Court's liberalized
version of the Spence test, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York found that masks could be symbolic speech regardless of whether a
"particularized message" was present." Yet, on appeal, the defendants still asserted
that the masks lacked the communicative elements necessary for First Amendment
protection.s
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed
with the lower court that the masks were protected symbolic speech, the court
minimally cited Hurley. The only time it directly addressed Hurley was in a
footnote saying that it believed the Spence test remained intact, even in the wake of
Hurley." The court said, "While we are mindful of Hurley's caution against
demanding a narrow and specific message before applying the First Amendment,
we have interpreted Hurley to leave intact the Supreme Court's test for expressive
conduct in Texas v. Johnson [that utilizes the Spence test]."'O Even with adoption
of the stricter test, the court still found that the masks constituted protected speech.
The court found that there was intent to send a message by quoting the American
61 356 F.3d 197,205 (2d Cit. 2004).
62 Id. at 199-200.
63 Id. at 200-01.
6 Id. at 201.
6s Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 232 F. Supp. 2d 205, 205
(S.D.N.Y.2002), rev'd, 356 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2004).
6 Id. at 216.
67 See id.
68 Kerik, 356 F.3d at 203.
6 Id. at 205 n.6.
70 Id.
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Knights' articulation of their goal "to convey to the public that [they] follow the
ideological tradition of the Klan and share many of the views about racial
separation and white pride with which the Klan has been identified."" Further, the
court asserted that it could not deny that the clothing of the Knights was expressive
and that it sent a message to others that could easily be interpreted.72 Thus, despite
holding that the Spence test was still intact and applying the stricter principles, the
Second Circuit still reached the same conclusion that the District Court did while
applying Hurley.
B. The Eleventh Circuit's "Reasonable Person"
In Holloman ex rel. Holloman, the Eleventh Circuit adopted a new
interpretation of the Hurley test." In Holloman, a high school student had been
publicly ridiculed and punished by his principal and teacher for remaining silent
during the Pledge of Allegiance.74 To communicate disapproval with the
administration's treatment of his classmate, Michael Holloman protested such
behavior the next day by silently raising his fist in the air instead of reciting the
pledge.7 S He, too, was punished and ridiculed by his principal and teacher.76
Holloman brought suit against various members of the school district for a number
of reasons-one being that he was punished for engaging in constitutionally
protected conduct.7 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed that
Holloman's conduct constituted speech worthy of First Amendment protection.7 1
The court referenced the stricter Spence test but noted it was liberalized in
Hurley. 9 However, the Eleventh Circuit differs from most other courts because it
incorporates a reasonable person element into the Hurley test. The court said,
"Thus, in determining whether conduct is expressive, we ask whether the
reasonable person would interpret it as some sort of message, not whether an
observer would necessarily infer a specific message."80
It is uncertain whether the reasonable person standard made Hurley any
stricter, as the court still applied the Hurley test in typical fashion. The court held
that Holloman's actions were protected under the First Amendment because it was
reasonable to infer that some other students would interpret Holloman's actions to
be in protest of the treatment of his classmate."' The court emphasized its Hurley
n Id. at 206 (alteration in original).
72 See id.
See Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1270 (11th Cir. 2004) (adding a
reasonableness element to the test).
74 Id. at 1260.
7s Id. at 1261.
76 Id.
7 Id. at 1260-62.
" Id. at 1270.
79Id
* Id. (emphasis in original).
s Id. at 1260-61, 1270.
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rationale by stating that "[e]ven if students were not aware of the specific message
Holloman was attempting to convey, his fist dearly expressed a generalized
message of disagreement or protest directed toward [his teacher], the school, or the
country in general."S2 Thus, the court did not analyze the Spence element that
required the likelihood to be great that others would understand the exact
"particularized message" Holloman was trying to send." However, the reasonable
person standard did seem to add another layer of analysis to the court's decision
than would otherwise be typical in administering the Hurley test. While the court
expressed a liberal view of symbolic speech, it still paused long enough to consider
whether the inference they constructed was actually reasonable.
C. The Sixth and Ninth Circuit's Harmony View
The Sixth and Ninth Circuits both have adopted a view that the Spence and
Hurley tests can live in harmony. These circuits apply the Spence factors as
outlined in Johnson, noting that in order to obtain constitutional protection, the
speech must contain a particularized message and the likelihood must be great that
others would interpret such message." However, they use Hurley to qualify this
test, saying that the message does not have to be narrow or succinct in order to be
protected." In Blau v. Fort Thomas Public School District, the Sixth Circuit held
that a middle school girl's clothing choices were not protected by symbolic speech."
Robert Blau, the father of Amanda Blau, filed suit on behalf of his daughter against
the school district for the district's approval of a dress code." When the court asked
about a message that Amanda might be trying to send with her clothing choices,
the Blaus claimed there was not one." Instead, Amanda just wanted to be able to
wear clothes that fit well and looked nice. 9
Despite this somewhat lackluster claim, the court still engaged in a symbolic
speech analysis. They recognized the particularized message test of Spence, but
combined it with Hurley, stating, "The threshold is not a difficult one, as 'a narrow,
succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection."' 90
Even though they adopted the liberal ideology of Hurley, the Sixth Circuit still
acknowledged a need to draw a line between what is conduct imbued with elements
of communication, and what is not. The Sixth Circuit said, "[T]he First
Amendment does not protect such vague and attenuated notions of
expression-namely, self-expression through any and all clothing that a 12-year old
8 See id. at 1270.
3 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974).
* Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
s Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).
86 401 F.3d 381, 390 (6th Cir. 2005).
" Id. at 386.
8s Id.
89 Id.
o Id. at 388.
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may wish to wear on a given day."" Since the court found that the Blaus did not
meet their burden of proving that their conduct had communicative elements, the
Sixth Circuit ruled that the First Amendment did not protect such actions. 2 In
fact, the court argued that any other decision would reflect poorly on laudable
precedent cases, stating that, "[t]o say that Amanda Blau's desire to wear clothes
she 'feel[s] good in,' as opposed to her desire to express 'any particular message' . . .
fits within [the] line of [precedent symbolic speech] cases gives the invocation of
precedent a bad name.""
The Ninth Circuit took the same approach in Kaahumanu v. Hawaii.94 In
Kaahumanu, a Hawaiian pastor and a wedding events organization sued the
Hawaiian Department of Land and Natural Resources (DNLR) for requiring
permits for commercial weddings on beaches.9s With the permits came a variety of
fees and requirements, including the requirement that the applicant take out
comprehensive public liability insurance in order to obtain the permit." The
plaintiffs alleged that the DNLR imposed unduly burdensome requirements on
their right to host commercial weddings on Hawaiian beaches.9 7
One of the plaintiffs arguments was that such requirements restrict free speech
because weddings are expressive conduct.98 In analyzing this argument, the Ninth
Circuit combined the Spence and the Hurley tests by saying that a particularized
message must be present and it must be likely that others would understand the
message in the surrounding circumstances. 99 However, a "narrow, succinctly
articulable message" is not a requirement.o The court held that the particularized
message of weddings was easy to discern even though each wedding is unique and
the message varies from couple to couple. The court stated, "The core of the
message in a wedding is a celebration of marriage and the uniting of two people in
a committed long-term relationship."'0o Thus, the court found that weddings easily
fit within the protection of the First Amendment.' 02
It is interesting to note that both of these circuits do not cite the full Hurley
phrase that is often quoted. Rather than saying that "a narrow, succinctly
articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection, which if
confined to expressions conveying a 'particularized message'. . . would never reach
the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold
x Id. at 390.
1 Id. at 389.
93 Id. (citation omitted).
See generally 682 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2012).
9sId. at 793.
96 Id. at 794.
9 Id. at 795-96.
98 Id.
9 Id. at 798.
1" Id. (citing Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995)).
101 Id. at 799.
102 Id.
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Sch[o]enberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll,"o 3 the courts either do not
mention the second half of the statement, or break the statement into two. The
Sixth Circuit acknowledged the "particularized message" element, yet used Hurley
to define what "particularized message" means by leaving out the express language
in Hurley that criticized this strict message element. It said, "The threshold is not a
difficult one, as 'a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of
constitutional protection.' . . . Otherwise, the First Amendment 'would never reach
the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold
Sch[o]enberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll."104 The Ninth Circuit simply
stated that a narrow, succinctly articulable message was not a condition for
protection.0o They did not even reference the "particularized message" criticism or
how Spence seemingly falls short of protecting artistic endeavors. Thus, it appears
as though the two circuits use Hurley as a way of qualifying and defining some
elements of the Spence Court's test rather than using it as binding precedent.
III. DRAWING ON THE OLD TO FORM THE NEW-A DYNAMIC TEST
In an area of law that is largely fact-specific, it is difficult to define a uniform
test that is able to adequately adapt to each new form of symbolic speech that
appears in courts. Each day, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Pinterest, and all other
forms of social media redefine how we express ourselves as a society. Surely, in
1974 when the Court adopted the Spence test, judges could not anticipate that one
day, society could express its likes through a thumbs up symbol on the Internet or
its emotions through smiley faces in text messages. Courts were still getting used to
the introduction of the peace sign.' 6 However, the fact that the Spence test has
withstood centuries of criticism and is still cited by most courts as the primary test
in symbolic speech claims shows that the Spence test does not lack merit. In fact,
with a little alteration, the original Spence test proves to be the perfect balance of
strictness and flexibility to adequately adapt to the changing needs of today's
society.
A. The Criticism of Spence
In order to create an altered version of the Spence test, it is essential to first
analyze the ways in which the test is lacking. Spence has met great criticism in the
area of artistic endeavors. As Hurley noted, a strict "particularized" message, as it
was understood by the Hurley Court and adopted by some later courts, would be
"o Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995)
(citation omitted).
1 Blau, 401 F.3d at 388.
1os Kaahumanu v. Hawaii, 682 F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cit. 2012).
106 See Jennifer Rosenberg, 1958 - Peace Symbol Created, ABOUr.CoM,
http://historyl900s.about.com/od/1950s/qt/peacesymbol.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2015) (stating that
the peace sign was created in 1958).
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problematic in protecting artistic works.' 7 One critic notes that "[t]he Spence
formulation may encompass most speech and symbolic conduct, as well as much
art, but it certainly does not include everything that one might regard as
'expressive.""o He argues that Spence would not reach many films, including
Disney's Fantasia, since some films do not include dialogue.1o' Additionally, he
argues that the Spence test would not reach classical music or even avant-garde
film.1 o Others criticize Spence because they feel its test does not protect those art
forms where the speaker intends different meanings for different audiences."'
However, proponents of the Spence test recognize the weakness of these
arguments. One scholar has stated that Justice Souter's "concern for the Spence
test's under appreciation of abstractness and silly rhymes seems misplaced" in
Hurley because the examples Souter lists as artistic forms of communication would
be protected in other ways." 2 He argues that the Jabberwocky verse of Lewis
Carroll, the paintings of Jackson Pollock, and even the music of Arnold
Schoenberg could be protected as pure speech, a doctrine that may be similar to
symbolic speech, but is treated very differently."1 3
However, there is a way to amend Spence to reconcile it with Hurley so that it
can challenge most of these criticisms. First, the Court must re-emphasize the
importance of context in deciphering whether conduct is imbued with elements of
communication and even whether the conduct sends a "particularized message."
Second, the Court can change two words of Spence's second prong in order to
make the test better suited to protect those art forms that intend a different
message for different audiences.
B. Re-focusing on Context-Getting Back to Original Spence
The Johnson Court did the Spence test a huge disservice when it re-stated the
elements of the test without the original emphasis on surrounding circumstances." 4
While few courts have noted this discrepancy because they tend to discuss context
separately from the test,"i5 re-emphasizing a surrounding circumstance element in
the Spence test could help ease some concerns about the "particularized message"
element. Context is the core of communication. Communication has been defined
as "socially situated meaning-making,"" 6 and it has been noted that "[m]eaning
107 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569.
10s Salamanca, supra note 48, at 165.
109 Id.
110 See id.
n1 See, e.g., R. George Wright, What Counts as "Speech" in the First Place?: Determining the
Scope of the Free Speech Clause, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1217, 1245 (2010).
112 McGoldrick, supra note 6, at 50.
113 Id.
114 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1989).
us See, e.g., id.
116 MICHAEL J. PAPA ET AL., ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION: PERSPECTIVES AND
TRENDS 3 (2008).
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occurs when information is placed within a context.""' Even elementary school
children are taught the importance of context in constructing meaning when they
are instructed to use context clues to help them decipher unfamiliar words."'
Similarly, a look at surrounding circumstances should be key when courts try to
decipher whether a particularized message is present in a case.
Surrounding circumstances can even help form a particularized message out of
those abstract methods of communication the Hurley Court was concerned Spence
may overlook, such as the music of Arnold Schoenberg. For example, with their
atonality, twelve-tone technique, and lack of lyrics, Schoenberg's musical
compositions may not seem to send any message but one of chaos."' Any layperson
listening to Schoenberg would be hard pressed to determine a particular message
that Schoenberg was trying to send. However, knowing the surrounding
circumstances such as Schoenberg was born to a Jewish family and lived in the time
of Nazi Germany,120 or that he wrote a piano piece in the shadow of his good
friend's death,'21 make it more plausible that a particularized message did exist.
Thus, courts need to highlight the importance of context in symbolic speech cases.
Context is even more important when one considers that the original purpose
of the Spence test was to protect expressive conduct, not objects.' 22 Thus, while the
Hurley Court criticized that Spence would not protect the paintings of Jackson
Pollock, the music of Arnold Schoenberg, or the Jabberwocky verse of Lewis
Carroll,'1 23 it is arguable that this was not the purpose of the Spence test in the first
place. Instead, an actor can obtain protection only when he puts those items into
action or when he sends a message to others by using symbols. On its own, a paper
copy of Schoenberg's musical composition will likely not be protected by Spence's
symbolic speech test, but if a person is arrested for playing Schoenberg on a bus or
on a street corner in a country where Schoenberg music is banned, he may likely
obtain First Amendment protection if he can show there was a particularized
message behind such performance and that others were likely to interpret a similar
message when they heard it. For example, if college students living in Nazi
Germany played Schoenberg music from the windows of their dorms when such
music was banned in Germany in the 1930s,'24 then that is likely to send a message
of protest.
"' Id. at 21.
" See, e.g., Riverside Unified Sch. Dist. Elementary Educ. Dep't, Context Clues, ENGAGENY
(June 2004), http://www.engageny.org/sites/default/files/resource/attachments/laguide-contextclues.p
df.
119 Anthony Tommasini, Unraveling the Knots of the 12 Tones, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/14/arts/music/14tomm.html?pagewanted all&_r=0.
120 Mark DeVoto, Arnold Schoenberg and Judaism: The Harder Road, TUFTS, http://www.tufts.ed
u/~mdevoto/Schoenberg.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2015).
121 Arnold Schanberg - Biography, ARNOLD SCHONBERG CENTER, http://www.schoenberg.at/in
dex.php/en/schoenberg-2/biographie (last updated Jan. 12, 2015).
122 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974) ("We are confronted ... with a case of
prosecution for the expression of an idea through activity.").
123 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).
124 DeVoto, supra note 120.
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In fact, a few months after the Spence decision, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York re-examined the role context plays in
cases involving symbolic speech. The New York Court of Appeals heard People v.
Radichl25 four years before Spence. In that case, the court held that a New York
statute prohibiting public defilement of the American flag did not infringe on an
art gallery owner's First Amendment right to display works of art depicting the
American flag in nontraditional means.'26 The gallery in this conflict featured
constructions of the American flag covering an erect penis and in the shape of a
six-foot human hanging from a yellow noose.'27 Anti-war protest music played on a
tape recorder as visitors viewed the installments.'28 The gallery owner claimed the
exhibition was his way of expressing disapproval of America's involvement in the
Vietnam War.' 29
In a petition for habeas corpus heard four years after the Radich decision and
only five months after the Spence decision, the District Court held that such a
display was certainly protected by the First Amendment.13 0 The court looked to
context when trying to discern whether Spence's "particularized message"
requirement had been met.' 3 ' They said that since the owner exhibited these pieces
at a time when America's involvement in the Vietnam War was most significant,
and because the anti-war protest music intensified the symbolic nature of the
gallery, it would be hard for visitors to miss the message the owner was trying to
send.132 They said the owner's actions consisted of more than "mindless nihilism"
and, indeed, contained a particularized message that was protected under the First
Amendment.3 3 Thus, the symbolic speech analysis is likely to change from case to
case depending on how an actor puts an object into action and depending on the
context surrounding the conduct. Context can make or break whether particular
conduct is protected.
C. Reconciling Spence with Hurley
A number of minute, yet important, discrepancies regarding the interpretation
of Spence and Hurley exist, and drawing attention to these misunderstandings may
help articulate why minor changes to Spence will help solve decades of confusion.
First, Hurley criticizes Spence, saying that a "narrow, succinctly articulable message
is not a condition of constitutional protection," 3 4 but nowhere in the Spence
opinion does the court ever make reference to a narrow or succinctly articulable
125 See generaly26 N.Y.2d 114 (1970), affd, 401 U.S. 531 (1971).
126 Id. at 116-17.
127 Id. at 117.





13 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).
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message. Hurley cites to Spence after using this language, but modifies the citation
with the introductory signal "cf.""3 Despite using the "cf.' to indicate that the
proposition stated in Hurley was not the main proposition of Spence, but was only
sufficiently analogous,136 later courts have interpreted this language as a definition
of the term "particularized" used in the Spence opinion. Yet, there is no proof that
such a definition paralleled what the Spence Court had in mind. In fact, a quick
search for synonyms of "particularize" in a thesaurus reveals that "particularize"
might mean "itemize," "enumerate," or "specify.""' It is arguably not synonymous
with "narrow" or "succinctly articulable."
Since there is no proof that the Spence Court intended to define "particularized
message" as one that was narrow or succinctly articulable, the Sixth and Ninth
Circuit's approach to symbolic speech serves as the best approach to this element.1"s
These circuits view Hurley not as defining what a "particularized message" is, but
rather as explaining what a "particularized message" is not. The person claiming
free speech must still prove that their conduct sends a particular message, but the
particular message does not have to be a narrow, succinctly articulable one. 13 This
approach will still liberalize the Spence test to some extent, but will also require
effort on the claimant's part to show that their conduct was imbued with
communicative elements. This will weed out any frivolous claims that have made a
mockery of the First Amendment, such as Blau v. Fort Thomas Public School
District.140 Such claims before found refuge in the liberal Hurley test and were far
removed from the important cases concerning flag desecration and war protesting
that were highly deserving of the court's time.
Second, it is important to acknowledge which prong of the Spence test caused
the Hurley court unease. Many courts mention the Hurley liberalization when
analyzing the first prong of the Spence test. However, the first prong is not a tough
one to meet, even under what some consider the stricter test. A look at the Second
Circuit's holding in Kerik reveals this. The lower court latched on to Hurley as a
safety blanket when trying to define whether a mask would be protected as
symbolic speech.14' Yet, the court of appeals had no problem reaching the same
conclusion-that masks were symbolic speech-under the seemingly stricter
Spence test.142 It was sufficient enough to meet the "particularized message" prong
to say that the group intended to draw an association between the American
Knights and the Ku Klux Klan.143 That message was specific.
135 Id.
136 See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1.2(a), at 55 (Columbia Law
Review Ass'n et al. eds., 19th ed. 2010) ("[The] [c]ited authority supports a proposition different from
the main proposition but sufficiently analogous to lend support.").
17 WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD ROGET'S A-Z THESAURUS 572 (Charlton Laird et al. eds., 1999).
13. See generally Kaahumanu v. Hawaii, 682 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2012); Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub.
Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2005).
139 See Kaahumanu, 682 F.3d at 798; Blau, 401 F.3d at 388.
" 401 F.3d at 388-90.
141 Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 2004).
142 Id. at 205-06.
143 Id. at 206.
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More likely than not, an actor has a reason or a motivation for his actions that
he can specify. For example, even Arnold Schoenberg admitted that his music has
some particular message behind it. In a letter to a Rabbi concerning Schoenberg's
plans in the Anti-Semitism movement, Schoenberg wrote, "Please don't
misunderstand me: I have no political ambition: my ambition would be fulfilled
entirely on music paper, if I had any ambition at all."1" This suggests that
Schoenberg used his music as a way of communicating messages. Thus, it seems
rather easy to prove the first element of the Spence test. The real trouble lies with
the second prong-that "the likelihood was great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it."1 4 5
The way it is worded, this phrase seems to imply that the exact particularized
message that was found in the first prong of the test must be the one that observers
interpret from the conduct. However, when one looks at art, music, or poetry, it is
nearly impossible that the viewer, listener, or reader will interpret the exact message
of the original sender. To fix this standard that is nearly impossible to overcome,
yet still keep an element of strictness, the Court should amend the second prong of
the Spence test to read, "the likelihood was great that a similar message would be
understood by those who viewed it."146 Such a small word change can make a huge
difference. It now leaves room to include artistic elements and even those art forms
where the speaker intends different meanings for different audiences. For example,
Arnold Schoenberg may have composed a piano piece in the shadow of his friend's
death to communicate his despair, sadness, or even anger. However, if a listener is
unaware of this friend's death, he could still take away a message of despair,
sadness, or anger, and Schoenberg's work would still be protected as symbolic
speech. The listener does not have to specifically discern that Schoenberg is upset
because of a friend's death.
Yet, such language is still strong enough to ensure that less meritorious claims
for symbolic speech are not afforded protection. For example, in State v. Green, the
appellant claimed that his use of a pine tree shaped air freshener should be
protected under the First Amendment.147 He claimed that the tree signaled to
others that he appreciates nature and cares about the scent of his car.148 The Court
of Appeals of Minnesota ruled that even if the appellant claimed a valid
particularized message, an outsider who viewed the air freshener would not likely
understand the particular message. 149 Such a ruling would still prove to be valid
under the "similar message" element of the proposed test. Even if the idea that the
driver appreciated both nature and having a good smelling car was worthy of being
considered a particularized message, there is little likelihood that others would
" DeVoto, supra note 120.
145 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974).
14 Cf id. ("[Tihe likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed
it") (emphasis added).
147 No. A04-1657, 2005 WL 2008521, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2005).
148 Id.
149 _1d.
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understand that the driver intended to send that message, or any message, by
hanging up a pine tree air freshener.
Thus, the new test for symbolic speech would read, "Conduct is protected as
symbolic speech if [a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and
in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that a similar message
would be understood by those who viewed it." When considering whether a
message is "particularized," it is not necessary that the message be narrow or
succinctly articulable. This test combines the strengths of the Spence and Hurley
tests, while eliminating their weaknesses.
CONCLUSION
It is impossible for the Court to predict where the great innovations of today
will lead us tomorrow. This is especially true in the world of symbolic speech.
However, remaining in a state of confusion by refusing to state a uniform test for
symbolic speech is not the answer. Such confusion as to which test, Spence or
Hurley, dictates can be a waste of time for courts that have to analyze each test
before declaring which they will apply in a given case. A uniform test can lead to
efficiency and can also cut down on frivolous claims since claimants will know the
exact burden they have to meet. As it stands now, depending on which test a court
ultimately applies a claimant may have a very tough burden or a very easy one.
With the easy burden comes cases that lead farther and farther away from those
original cases such as flag, peace signs, and war protests that truly mirrored what
the First Amendment stands for-protecting society's passions. The new test
articulated in this Note remains strict enough to protect the sanctity of the First
Amendment by weeding out absurd fact patterns, while still leaving room for
protection for those works of art that are meant to be abstract and hard to define.
The Supreme Court should consider declaring this test as the uniform test for
symbolic speech.
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